July 17, 2011

The Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) STATEMENT

The Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) refers to the UN Security Council Presidential statement SC/10294 regarding the so- called ‘Kampala Accord (KA)’ of 9thJune 2011on the situation in Somalia.

It is rather reassuring that the UN Security never fails in all its communications vis-à-vis the situation in Somali to reiterate and reaffirm its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. But at the same time the UN Security Council has for the last two decades been endorsing and legalizing foreign actors’ decisions and actions eroding the Somali Sovereignty. Not the least of all the Council’s acquiescence of the illegal invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian proxy mercenaries at the behest of the United States of America, since acquiescence means consent.

The latest example of such UN Security Council endorsements of foreign actors’ decisions and actions eroding Somali sovereignty is that so-called ‘KA’, despite its being fraught with illegalities. Perhaps the Council never bothered to even consult its legal advisors before out rightly endorsing the ‘KA’ and also calling for its early implementation.

The ‘KA’ is not only fraught with illegalities, but it is also on a collision course with the Transitional Charter, the raison de’tre for the very existence of the puppet entity that the foreign actors dub as a legitimate Somali government.

The ‘KA’ is a foreign actors’ dictation, because neither of the two Somali signatories, the putative parties to the ‘KA’, knows an iota about the language in which that document is written. Quite obviously they blindly signed a blank cheque – a pre- prepared document on behalf of the foreign actors.

The following remarks, among others, unveil the illegalities that the ‘KA’ is loaded with:

Para.1- affirms recognition of the Transitional Charter, but violates both its letter and spirit.

Para.2- the Transitional Charter does not empower the Speaker of the parliament to enter into any such agreement. His signing the ‘KA’ is a gross violation of the Charter and a clear usurpation of the power that the Charter invested in parliament to approve or not any such agreement (s).

Para.3&4(n-o) – foreign actors allow themselves a prerogative hegemony over the internal affairs of a sovereign country that a Somali political scientist defines as a ‘stealth Trusteeship’

Para. 4(a-b)- grossly violate the Charter that invests no such power in the two signatories of the ‘KA

Para. 4(d,f &k) – is a dictation by the foreign actors denying parliament any alternative option.

Para. 4 (r) the planned Mogadishu Conference will never be unlike Abdalla Yusuf’s 2007 so-called Reconciliation Conference for international consumption that was held in a fortress under heavy guard mounted by foreign mercenaries; and was attended by a limited and selected number of participants. Its outcome was announced a success, but thereafter it was lost in obscurity.

There have been a great deal of outcries expressed by the Somali people, prominent personalities, intellectuals and others, both inside and out side the country that have flooded all the Somali owned websites critical about the expedient involvement of foreign actors in the Somali affairs in general. And about the farcical ‘KA’ in particular, than we have enough space for reproducing many of those expressions; but have only managed to reproduce the following two statements:

THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOMALI

REPUBLIC. FEDERAL OR DECENTRALIZED UNITARY STATE

By Abdirazak Haji Hussein (Prime Minister of the Somali Republic,1964-1967)

I. Introduction

I begin with a compressed background to the current plight of Somalia. Second, I will offer brief comments on the frequently raised option of a “federal state.” Third, I will advance the value of a “decentralized unitary” version that I advocate. I will conclude with brief reflections on the necessity for a combination of a particular type of administrative cadre and a cohort of extraordinary political leadership.

II. Background

By all accounts, Somalia is now regarded as a supreme example of a failed state. This is due to a bloody and devastating clanistic civil strife that broke out soon after the two-decade dictatorial regime of Siyaad Barre crumbled in the teeth of resistance and wide popular alienation.

During this prolonged communal war, more than 15 peace and reconciliation conferences have been mounted and paid for by the “international community.” Alas, All of them had ended up in total failure. The tremendous efforts, resources and time invested in these efforts, particularly, those held in Arta, Djibouit, from April to August 2000 and at Eldoret/Embagathi, Kenya, from October 2002 to November 2004, have taught us numerous lessons. For one thing, those who had been invited to participate as “Somali leaders’” were, except at Arta, primarily, warlords and their cronies. This new visibility bestowed on them legitimated ill-earned name recognition as the sole Somali leaders to be reckoned with. The warlords knew all along that restoring peace, as we know it, would be tantamount to a loss of the limelight and fortunes they had ill gotten, as well as expose them to personal vulnerability. Thus, it became clear that the warlords’ real interest had always been to fuel the on-going civil war.

In view of the above, what has become ironic is why the international actors would acquiesce, and at times with palpable enthusiasm, to such context. It might not be unreasonable to question the sincerity of these outside facilitators. Rather than steering the Somali people to search for a durable and sustainable solution to the multiple crises, the efforts of the international actors led to the continuation of the ruin of the country and sowed strong suspicion among Somalis towards the outside world.

During the decade and half of the warlords’ reign of terror (January 1991 to June 2006), at least two third of a million Somalis about 600,000 and 800,000 had been killed by bullets or perished of starvation and other diseases related to the reign of terror. In addition, about a million more fled and sought refuge in other countries, while another one and half million were internally displaced. A further national cost has been the looting, by the warlords and their henchmen, of the public wealth and property.

Though long over-due, (i.e. after more than 16 years of untold death and devastation), those criminal warlords would also face, at long last, the same fate of their predecessor, Siyaad Barre. A popular uprising in Mogadishu in mid 2006 overran them irreversibly. Now, the challenge is to bring warlords and their accomplices to account for their deeds.

III. The Federal Option:

A combination of blurred vision and shortsightedness is evident whenever the question of the future constitutional structure for the future of the Somali Republic is brought up for debate. Because of the autocratic nature of the last regime, characterized by excessive centralization and incompetence, many Somalis express an antithetical view of a unitary, even decentralized state. ce’l disordersf licallyessively centralized and mismanaged, the overwhelming majority of the participantsssion on the federalThis is the reason, among others, why the consensus of those involved in the debate is generally, and summarily, in favor of a federal system, to the point that it has been already suggested that a federal system – that is, one which “institutionalizes clan-based power-sharing” formula – as a precondition for any future political dispensation.

In my view, the characteristics that might even remotely warrant a federal system for the Somali Republic are absent. Among the factors that might/would justify federalism for any given country are: the existence of unbridgeable and irreconcilable ethnic, religious or other cultural differences, and/or geographical barriers that would make inter-action/interconnection among the inhabitants difficult or impossible. Fortunately, none of such factors exist in Somalia. Yet, and regrettably, many, many Somalis don’t seem to value, let alone be thankful for, the God-given blessing of strong commonalities – an attribute so rare in most of Africa. As Professor I. M. Lewis, and other scholars, had asserted long ago,”… in contrast to the rest of Africa where states are struggling to become nations, the Somali people represent a nation struggling to become a state”. Similarly, Dr. Abdirahman Ali Hersi, in an essay on the subject a few years ago, had this to say: “Those who insist on federalism may wish, wittingly or unwittingly, to dig a grave for the Somali state that they purport to have been trying to revive”. Dr. Hersi concluded with a clear forewarning by declaring: “Without doubt a federal system of rule is the ultimate, i.e. the most effective prescription for Somalia’s NATURAL SELF-DESTRUCTION”. I believe there can hardly be a better way of articulating the inherently disastrous consequences of adopting federalism as a constitutional system for the Third Somali Republic.

Here, my basic proposition is this: although a federal system has been good and workable in countries like Switzerland, U.S.A. Canada, and Germany, to name just a few, it is less likely to be so in the Somali Republic’s case. A major reason is the huge gap in social, economic, political and civic standards between the peoples of the abovementioned countries and the people of the Somali Republic. Closer to home, we have an African country, Nigeria, which, from the very beginning of its national independence in the 1960s, adopted a federal system patterned on that of the U.S.A. Because of myriad problems of local nature, including – but not limited to – sharp ethnic cleavages, linguistic and religious differences, and low levels of modern political experience, the arrangement has not worked as the original hope was. Soon after independence, the military found a justification to take over power. After decades of military rule and a horrendous civil war, it is only these past ten years that the country had a democratically elected civilian federal government. Still, Nigeria is bedeviled by internecine and religious violence and the sustainability of the federal system has yet to pass the crucial test: stable cohesion of regions, the harmonization of socio-economic conditions, and the steep challenges of developmental transformation.

Despite the above, many who advocate a federal option, to the exclusion of other possibilities, justify their position primarily as a reaction to the military authoritarianism and the ensuing civil disorder. Furthermore, active supporters of “Federalism” are the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya – they were mandated by the OAU (later to become the AU) to organize and convene the 14th National reconciliation and Peace Conference at Eldoret. Here, then, a few highly relevant reflections are in order. It was Ethiopia who took the lead organizing and influencing the composition of the Somali participants in that conference. In that capacity, Ethiopia selected those warlords whom it deemed to be amenable to Ethiopian priorities. Basically clients, the warlords endorsed Ethiopia’s long-held strategic design to forestall a strong Somali national state. This convergence of Ethiopian and the Somali warlords’ interests shaped the promotion of the federal option. As a result, the current Transitional Federal Constitution, which was written up and approved in 2004, has been blessed by those who are bent on the continuation of the brittleness of any future Somali national institutions. Moreover, the New DRAFT Constitution, authored by primarily non-Somali experts, will soon be submitted to the current Transitional Parliament for approval, instead of a popular referendum. It, too, calls for a federal system, with no opportunity for an alternative to be presented.

The other key outside players in the Somali drama have been conspicuous in their condoning of “federalism.” Preoccupied with their own “national/security interests” in the Horn of Africa, major nations seem to think that their concerns would be best served by supporting Ethiopian/ Kenyan designs, even if that leads to the further balkanization of the Somali people. The evidence of such collusion is clearly underscored by the December 2006 Ethiopian illegal invasion of zones of southern Somali Republic, including Mogadishu. This, it has now become public, was undertaken with the encouragement of the US administration of President George W. Bush. That Ethiopian aggression continued for well over three years and in the process had wrecked havoc of catastrophic proportion. Ethiopian meddling in the internal affairs of the Somali Republic can also be observed in the ways in which the other regions of the country are often cavalierly transgressed. Ironically, while Western powers publicly announce to the whole world that they firmly recognize and respect Somali Republic’s national unity and territorial integrity, they, at the same time, give approval of acts that accelerate the fragmentation of the Somali people. An example of this, is the wheeling and dealing directly with the leaders of “Somaliland” and “Puntland” on an equal footing with, if not preferable to, the TFG. Western governments ought to remember that it was they that had, in essence, helped create this federal dispensation as the only legal/constitutional authority responsible for all matters, big and small, concerning the Somali Republic. If the USA/EU powers honored their own public commitment to the rebuilding of Somali national state and institutions, such a firm stand could have easily instructed the leaders of the two regions of the rules of engagement. More damagingly, Western governments have now moved to devise a new policy: dual track – an engagement that offers those regions (and perhaps others to follow) full economic and security assistance. Such a posture will no doubt be interpreted by many, including the regional ambitious, to press hard for seeking an independent status of their own.

IV. ALTERNATIVE: Decentralized Unitary System.

To demonstrate that NOT all unitary structures are pernicious, it should be remembered that it was the European colonial administrations in Africa, and elsewhere, that had unified colonial peoples in those countries, including Somalia, under one single central and, yes, able administrative structure. Before the arrival of the colonialists, those countries were divided into principalities, kingdoms, chiefdoms and other sectarian/faith-based social orders, with no meaningful and consistent inter-actions/inter-connections in a national sense. One has to summon up a little bit of courage to give that much credit to the by-gone European colonizers, in spite of the many awful injustices they inflicted. I don’t think there is much dispute about the fact that those colonial centralized administrations were competent, despite the fact that the tools of communication were not as highly advanced and reliable as they are today.

It is unwise to quickly write off a unitary state just because it has strong central institutions. Moreover, in the case of Somalia, Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s 21-year autocratic and excessively concentrated rule should not be taken as a paradigm for the unitary option. It should rather be seen as an unfortunate and aberrant episode. These remarks ought not to give the impression that I am an advocate of an absolute centralized system of government. On the contrary, I am a strong believer in democratic representation and a capable constitutional order. An example of this type could be found in such diverse countries as France, South Africa, Britain, Tanzanian, Ghana, and Botswana – all reputed to be successful and stable.

From the structural standpoint, federalism seems to be substantially different from the Decentralized Unitary form. It’s not only that federalism is more complicated in terms of legislative and bureaucratic perspectives; but also, it is more likely to be amenable to threats to national unity and territorial integrity of the state. Power-hungry and self-serving federal state(s) office-holders could easily threaten and/or blackmail the federal government to secede if their demand(s) were not met. It’s also easy for foreign meddling in the Somali Republic’s internal affairs through incipient federal states. We have already seen clear evidence of this in the current case of “Somaliland” and

“Puntland.”

Rather than importing federal arrangements that govern strong and advanced constitutional societies, I proffer that the proposed federal system for the Somali people might, if adopted, bring easily about an unintended and counter-productive spectacle of a country divided into numerous zones(i.e federal states) that are based on clanist allegiances, instead of national civic-mindedness. Such a situation would potentially erode the very foundation of national unity and territorial integrity. Clearly, it would sanction the current situation – a time in which the country is already in a condition of clanistic divisions or war-lord-dominated enclaves. In such a specter, it’s easy to foretell that the would-be elected office-holders will have to come from the bigger clan(s) of the major clan-family of a given region. This would mean that the political and economic powers would come to be concentrated, in perpetuity, in the hands of a small but powerful clan-oligarchy, thus bringing about what detractors of the centralized system were supposedly trying to forestall. Worse yet, there can be little or no chance for the mid-sized and/or minor clans/sub-clans to get their fair share of the political dispensation.

In light of the foregoing, a decentralized unitary system, with guarantees of regional or local autonomy, would be more, much more, appropriate for the Third Somali Republic. The unitary decentralized system provides not only regional/local capacitation but it’s also more pragmatic and cost-effective. Though regional/local autonomy should be constitutionally guaranteed, its implementation should be contingent on each region’s demonstrable administrative ability to undertake such duties and responsibilities. Once such capability is verified a transfer of such a mandate should be constitutionally delineated and put into action.

V. Conclusion: Low Human capital and a Paucity of

Qualified Leadership.

In my view, the real problem facing today’s Somalia is not, primarily, the form of constitutional structure that may be most appropriate. The core of the whole matter is, in my considered opinion, the human factor. On paper, any system of governance may sound good and workable. But whether such a constitutional order is, in actual fact, good or not, will depend on the ability, dedication and good faith of those who are called upon to make it work on the ground. Therefore, the focus and attention of all those who sincerely have Somalia’s prolonged tragedy at heart and willing to extend a helping hand should rather be directed on how to urgently provide such qualified manpower — though worrying about constitutional structure is appropriate. Without a cadre sufficient in quantity, and with proven educational and administrative skills, any form of constitutional framework will be doomed.

To be sure, education and skills are necessarily but not sufficient for good governance. Perhaps the most supreme factor is the appearance on the stage of a political leadership with an appealing and achievable VISION and grounded in trust and lawfulness. The combination of these two, in concert with a genuine international solidarity that is generous enough, will, for the first time in two decades, commence the long journey of reviving Somali national spirit and institutions.

If and when this happens, clanism (“Qabiil ama Qabyaaalad) and its divisive relevance/influence on national politics will be reduced to a minor and anachronistic reminder of a time that is no more. With this new age, then, begins the genuine struggle to overcome chronic underdevelopment.

Balkanization and Subjugation

Of Somalia
By Abukar Arman*
July 07, 2011

Let me begin by saying that had it not been for Somalis transgressing against other Somalis, the state would neither have been in its current pitifully fragmented state, nor would it have become the poster child for the failed states.

Since its independence 51 years ago, Somalia has been a pawn in a geopolitical chess game and a gambit in the global war on terrorism. In that half a century, Somalia has never been entirely independent of foreign influences, and exploitations. But, it was never pushed down to a level similar to the current one where its nationhood, history, and indeed future aspirations are at a great risk.

Climbing out of the current predicament would require an entirely different approach, and stepping outside the confinement of the conventional.

Like a human being facing a deadly threat, there comes a time in a nation’s history when screaming, kicking, scratching, and using whatever means available to it is not only an existentialist obligation, but a moral one. Somalia is facing such a moment as a result of a number of policies and resolutions designed to systematically erode its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The Straw that broke the camel’s back:

Though the motives driving these policies and resolutions are by no means monolithic, they have further divided a war-fatigued nation and traumatized people; they exacerbated the humanitarian disaster; they exposed it to the exploitation of the political vultures of the 21st Century; they hindered and in some cases sabotaged the incubation process for progress and reform, and facilitated a process whereby the annexation of the Somali state by its patiently keen neighbors is imminent. The latest of these eroding elements was ceremoniously delivered through the Kampala Accord.

Though the Kampla Accord offers a number of provisions to bridge the sensationalized political difference between the top leadership, in a vague language used to articulate Articles 4 (j), (k), and (n), it dictates certain impositions. It denies the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) its authority to thoroughly debate the merit of the Accord before ratifying it, scrutinize leadership and if necessary holds them accountable, and it officially places the TFG under what political scientist Afyare Elmi calls “stealth trusteeship” (define). Specifically, under what the accord refers to as The Bureau-a coalition of stakeholder nations and institutions.
Building-blocks of deconstruction:

Somalia’s fate is now in a runaway train known as the “building-blocks” – a political train fueled with what could only be described as “groupthink” energy. Within the Somali context, the concept promotes the official dismemberment of the State by “re-tribalization” and paves the way for its detrimental deconstruction or “re-colonization”.

In his 1994 essay, ‘The Bondage of Boundaries’, prominent Africanist—Professor Ali Mazrui—argues that “External re-colonization under the banner of humanitarianism is entirely conceivable. Countries like Somalia…where central control has collapsed may invite an inevitable intervention”. Uncharacteristic of his long running scholarly contributions, he takes a simplistic approach in advocating for Ethiopia’s re-colonization of Somalia on behalf of the international community, and if it proves necessary, to annex it as it (Ethiopia) has the imperialist appetite that attracted it in the past to annex its neighboring ethnic communities.

The result was a bloody fiasco of historic proportion. Ethiopia’s two year deadly occupation (2007-09) left tens of thousands of Somalis dead and close to 2 million displaced, it leveled one third of Mogadishu, and boosted the recruitment appeal of the violent extremist militia al-Shabaab.

Despite the trail of blood it left behind, some are still convinced that the building-blocks concept is a viable one – size fits all. They argue that this system has anchored “sustainable federalism” in Ethiopia…never mind the profound complexities of the Somali clan dynamic, and the history between the two nations.
The Politics of Simplicity:

A year or so ago, in the course of our discussion over lunch in Washington (DC), my interlocutor—a prominent analyst and one of the leading opinion makers on Somalia—asked me a question that perplexed me a bit.“So, when would President Sharif Ahmed realize that the only way the international community would continue its support is to declare his outfit as SCS?” he siad. Asking for clarification, I responded: “What is SCS?” My interlocutor replied with a flare of confidence and a grin:“South Central Somalia, of course. And considering how resourceful the southerners are, SCS could easily become the commercial center that attracts business people from Somaliland and Puntland”.

I told the expert that this could only be a viable approach if one deliberately ignores certain crucial facts: 1) That the Transitional Federal Institutions, as a body, is a microcosm of the Somali society as there is not a single clan left out of the power-sharing. 2) That there are many Ministers and Parliament Members currently serving in the TFI, and many soldiers serving in the Somali National Army who hail from Somaliland and Puntland. 3) That after two decades of bloody push and pull, people have finally resigned to the fact that there is not a single clan who could claim exclusive rights to Mogadishu. Currently, the economic, military, numerical, and political power is spread across clans. 4) That the suggested approach would be like solving a problem by creating several others.

However, the expert remained relentlessly convinced; giving a fresh meaning to George Orwell’s “One has to belong to the intelligentsia (or the expert community) to believe things like that…”
Renewed Energy:

On September 2010, the Noref Report by the Norwegian Peace-building Center titled ‘Remaking of the Somali State: a renewed building-block approach’ was released. The report would resuscitate the ailing concept. The report advocated breaking up each regional territory into “a smaller pieces —building blocks— that can more effectively be managed by local authorities; then, when these become working polities, reunite them under a decentralized, federal or even con-federal structure.”

A month later, on October 2010, the US State Department officially unveiled its “Dual-Track approach toward Somalia.” In this approach, the US decided to continue its dialogue and support of the TFG open the political floodgates and actively engage all actors, and keep all doors open for the emerging ones so long as they oppose al-Shabaab.

Less than a year later, a quick gaze at the political landscape projects a daunting picture.
Over a dozen regional administrations, city and village states with their own presidents, foreign ministers, and defense ministers have emerged. So much for sustainable security collaboration, unified military command, and nation to nation treaties of mutual interest.
Kacdoon:

It is within this context that the Accord became the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak. The Accord has ignited protests in many parts of Somalia and abroad. Somalis in many parts of the world are organizing grassroots movements intended to salvage the Somali state. Kacdoon (uprising in Somali) is a Facebook group that started less than a month ago and it already has close to 10,000 subscribers.

Finally, the dormant conscience had a rude awakening. And the collective will of the people, especially the younger generation, is making a clear demand: the Kampala Accord shall only be ratified if it is in the best interest of the nation, not as result of a pressure or coercion from the international community or regional authority. The will of the people is reverberating throughout the country as well as the diaspora communities around the world and they are screaming for an indigenous solution to the Somali problem.

Foreign concocted solutions have a miserable record in Somalia. The irony is that the very aforementioned report promoting the Building-block approach recognizes that “Somalia has become the graveyard of externally sponsored state-building initiates” while it offers yet another one.

Proponents of the Accord argue that it is too late to discuss, change, or reject it as one of its critical aspects has already been implemented. A Prime Minister was ousted and another one appointed and approved by Parliament, and a new government is being formed. The opponents, on the other hand, cite a number of reasons why the Accord should be declared null-and-void; chief among them is the argument that the Accord was an agreement made between two of the top leadership—the President and the Speaker of the Parliament who had a difference of opinion—and did some costly horse trading that flies in the face of the Transitional Federal Charter and the original Somali constitution. While the President has the authority to unilaterally represent the Presidency, the Speaker of the Parliament has no authority to unilaterally represent the Parliament in such an agreement that, among other things, shackles their authority.

So, TFP should yield to the will of the Somali people. It should unequivocally reject the aspects of the Accord that clearly encroaches in the autonomy of the nation and the right of the Parliament to discharge their mandate. This is the only way to face up to the long unyielding campaign to eradicate the Somali state, and to the special interest groups who have cleverly been weaving their short-sighted schemes into the international effort to find a political panacea. Moreover, this is the way for the TFP to demonstrate its willingness to transcend its own short-sighted political interest and stand for the nation.

Abukar Arman is Somalia’s Special Envoy to the United States.

Source: Scoop Indepenedent News

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Unfortunately, the UN Security Council has never concerned itself to address the Somali problems in their true perspectives, because of the involvement of some of its key members. And at the same time the UN bureaucracy manages the foreign actors’ debacle distortions and scape-goating vis-a-vis the situation in Somali.

The ARS reiterates, but for the record, that the current cycle of the Somali dilemma is western led external actors’ own creation and responsibilities for the last four and a half years since Christmas Eve 2006. The crisis of the earlier sixteen years (1991-2006) had been resolved and has no linkage with the present ongoing crises of the foreign actors’ creation, whatsoever. After defeating former war lords of USA (CIA) clients, other thugs and anarchists by a popular uprising in the Somali capital and its environs during Feb.-June 2006, the Somali people put that previous era behind themselves once and for ever. That development in the Somali capital was instantly emulated in all areas south of the Puntland administrated territory. Peace, security and the rule of other law were restored throughout the land. The people regained their freedom and pursued own endeavors in a secure environment. They also voluntarily participated in communal efforts of re-habilitation programs of the essential infrastructures. Both the Mogadishu port and airport were re-habilitated and opened to traffic after more than a decade of disuse since the withdrawal of UN (UNOSOM) forces during the first week of March 1995. All pot holes in the city roads were patched up. All these were achieved by the Somali people alone with no cost to the international community.

However, it is a common knowledge that all the above mentioned miracle achievements of peace, stability and promising recovery progress were aborted within mere six months at the pleasure of the United States government that sanctioned and unleashed the Ethiopian proxy invasion of Somalia. That United States’ debacle alone, which other western powers also joined later, spawned all the current multi facetted Somali tragedy. The perpetrators of this tragedy continue to distort history and portray the crisis in Somali as mere continuation of early upheavals in 1991, but that is far from the truth. The present crisis only dates from Christmas Eve 2006, as sated above ipso facto.

While the above dictums are for the record and future posterity at best, the ‘KA’ was not the first illegality, the violation of the Transitional Charter, at the whims of the foreign actors. The Djibouti agreement so much vaunted by the foreign actors, and apparently even acknowledged by the UN Security Council, was the first of such violations. While the Transitional Charter specifically denied any extensions of the term of the transitional period that should have expired on 20th August 2009; it was easily extended for further two years. And now further one year by the ’KA’.

The foreign actors always manage acceptance of such violations through the corrupt puppet entities, the so-called TFIs.

Asmara, Eritrea

12/07/11

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